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The Village of Billionaires: Fair Taxation and Redistribution 
Amid Relative and Absolute Poverty
by Alexis Brassey and Henry Ordower
Aptly named, the Village of Billionaires is 
populated exclusively with billionaires. Every 
family living there has abundant wealth and 
privilege. Every driveway is lined with luxury 
vehicles like Rolls Royces, Bentleys, and Ferraris. 
Each house has its own swimming pool, gym 
complex, helicopter, and helipad. The village 
airport is filled with private Gulfstream and 
Boeing aircrafts. Residents have access to the top-
notch health services, education, road systems, 
information and communications technology 
equipment, and shopping facilities. Simply put, 
villagers enjoy the very best of what the world has 
to offer. The village governs itself by committee, 
and each family nominates someone to sit on the 
council.
Sadly, as a result of overspending on yachts 
and fine wines, one of the families in the village 
has suffered a financial setback — they are down 
to their last $100 million dollars. The family 
appeals to the village council, which sets up a 
social metrics commission to develop an approach 
to measuring poverty.1 The commission’s remit is 
to identify those least able to make ends meet. It 
takes into account all material resources, not just 
incomes, and accounts for all the inescapable costs 
that families may face including child care, 
maintenance of super yachts, replenishing stocks 
of fine wine, extensive foreign holidays, helicopter 
maintenance, and mortgage costs.2 The 
commission concludes that any family with less 
than 40 percent of the median income and wealth 
for the village falls within the poverty category, 
and it resolves to develop interventions and 
support to reduce the incidence of poverty and 
mitigate the impact of poverty for those who 
experience it.
To address the immediate problem, the 
villagers impose a progressive wealth tax on the 
billionaire families such that the family down to 
their last $100 million has its wealth restored to the 
$400 million range and therefore is no longer 
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In this article, the authors explore the notion 
of fairness in international tax using the parable 
of the Village of Billionaires to highlight the 
moral dilemma posed by redistributing tax 
revenue to address relative poverty within a 
developed country when absolute poverty 
exists beyond the village walls.
Copyright 2020 Alexis Brassey and Henry 
Ordower. All rights reserved.
1
The Legatum Institute Foundation’s Social Metrics Commission 
report uses similar language to explain its methodology for generating a 
working definition of poverty for the United Kingdom. Philippa Stroud, 
“Measuring Poverty 2019 — A Report of the Social Metrics 
Commission,” The Legatum Institute Foundation (July 2019).
2
This is not to suggest that super yachts, fine wine, and extensive 
foreign holidays are inescapable costs per se, but that they appear so 
based on a relative — rather than an absolute — analysis. In other words, 
the definition of inescapable costs is relative.
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suffering from poverty based on the commission’s 
assessment. The family is also given access to an 
emergency fund to ensure it does not fall into 
poverty again. To save embarrassment, the 
emergency fund is available on a universal basis 
and is not means tested. The villagers happily 
declare the problem solved.
Outside the village walls, there is another 
town. That town is suffering from actual poverty 
as defined by the U.N., that is:
a condition characterized by severe 
deprivation of basic human needs, 
including food, safe drinking water, 
sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education and information. It depends not 
only on income but also on access to 
services.3
The Village of Billionaires is the principal 
place of employment for town residents. Workers 
from the town commute to the village to maintain 
its facilities and perform other routine and menial 
functions. Some workers provide household 
services and child care on a residential basis and 
must be available around the clock; they are 
housed in quarters similar to the housing in their 
own town, but with more attractive exteriors to 
maintain the village’s overall aura. Wages are 
based on the prevailing wage that residents of the 
other town earn when working in their own town 
or elsewhere to ensure that workers receive a fair, 
comparable wage for their town. Workers who 
have completed at least 40 quarters of 
employment in the Village of Billionaires are 
entitled to a retirement benefit beginning at age 
65. Anyone who works in the Village of 
Billionaires must contribute a nonrefundable 20 
percent of their wages to the retirement benefit 
fund. Those who do not complete 40 quarters of 
employment receive nothing from the fund. Of 
course, those who work in the Village of 
Billionaires probably pay taxes where they live as 
well.
When criticized for the opulence of their 
community alongside the impoverished town, 
residents of the Village of Billionaires are quick to 
point out that they are job creators. Without them, 
conditions in the town — to which the residents of 
the Village of Billionaires owe nothing — would 
be much worse. Unemployment would be higher 
without the wealthy neighbor. And nothing 
prevents resourceful residents of the poorer town 
from becoming billionaires and eventually 
applying to immigrate to the Village of 
Billionaires. Nevertheless, the Village of 
Billionaires allocates up to 2 percent of its annual 
budget to foreign assistance, and residents of 
various impoverished communities thank the 
residents of the Village of Billionaires for the 
assistance with nice letters and remember the aid 
in their evening prayers. Most billionaire 
residents happily pay their fair share of the taxes 
needed to maintain the community and provide 
foreign assistance, although some grumble about 
expenditures like foreign assistance that do not 
benefit them directly.
I. Introduction
This reductio ad absurdum4 parable introduces 
the stark contrast between relative and absolute 
poverty. Both concepts are important when 
determining tax structures. Recent discussions 
about tax justice and the principles underpinning 
the international tax regime often emphasize the 
idea that companies and individuals should pay 
their fair share — not just in the domestic sense, 
but also in an international sense.5 It is reasonable 
to assume that taxation is the means by which the 
state funds public services and, in some 
jurisdictions, contributes to greater equality. The 
parable, however, shows that relative poverty 
within a society may be a false indication of 
genuine need, and it reminds the reader that 
empirical data can help us refocus our definition 
of fairness. This is not to suggest that relative 
poverty is a pseudo-need, but that the moral 
obligation to resolve relative poverty is minimal 
when compared with the far more pressing 
problem of absolute poverty. Setting a goal of 
3
U.N., “Report of the World Summit for Social Development” (Mar. 
6-12, 1995).
4
Absurdity is itself relative — after all, the Village of Billionaires has 
features reminiscent of several developed democracies.
5
OECD, “Ensuring Multinationals Pay a Fair Share of Taxes” (last 
accessed Mar. 1, 2020); Tax Justice UK, “Fair Share: Increasing Company 
Tax Contributions” (last accessed Mar. 1, 2020); IRS, “The Agency, Its 
Mission and Statutory Authority” (last accessed Mar. 1, 2020); and HM 
Revenue & Customs, “Tackling Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Other 
Forms of Non-Compliance” (Mar. 2019).
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contributing to greater equality within a society 
necessarily gives rise to competing claims 
internationally. This is especially the case when 
considering international tax challenges such as 
those the OECD discusses in its 2019 work 
program for taxing the digital economy.6
This article examines competing claims for tax 
revenues and considers the specific categories of 
relative, as opposed to absolute, poverty. If one 
accepts that taxation is to fund public services, the 
question then arises, at least in international tax: 
Which jurisdiction’s public services should be 
funded? If the motivation for raising taxes is to 
tackle inequality, what has the greater claim, 
international inequality or national inequality? 
These questions require us to consider whether 
relative or absolute poverty is more pressing. If 
we conclude that international inequality and 
absolute poverty are more pressing, are we still 
permitted to use resources to address national 
inequality and relative poverty? What if we lack 
the resources, political will, and popular support 
necessary to confront international inequality and 
absolute poverty?
This article contends that there is a far 
stronger moral claim7 for tax revenue to be 
redistributed on an international basis rather than 
a national basis. Further, it argues that the 
purported moral authority to address inequality 
within national borders is really a political 
demand to further the economic interests of 
particular groups that are already among the 
most economically privileged when viewed on an 
international spectrum. This article also finds that 
we lack the political will to truly confront 
international poverty — at least beyond 
contributing minimal resources to fight 
international poverty, which ultimately means we 
acknowledge the problem, but refuse to make the 
sacrifices necessary provide a remedy.
Resource availability is also a relative concept: 
The bulk of any national budget is committed to 
maintaining existing infrastructure leaving little 
funding for international development unless one 
opts to sacrifice maintenance for the morally 
superior aim of eliminating absolute poverty. 
Accordingly, the resources that are considered 
available for allocation in this article are only 
those resources dedicated to addressing either 
local or international poverty.
This article is divided into six sections, 
including this introduction. Section II tackles 
slippery definitional problems around the terms 
“tax justice” and “fair share.” What do these 
terms mean when they are used by different 
economic agents and to what end? What do those 
agents want to achieve when they use these terms, 
and what moral basis do they rely upon to make 
those claims? Can claims of fairness pertaining to 
equality extend to redistribution beyond specific 
absolute levels of resource allocation and, if so, 
what levels?
Section III sets out a proposal for ongoing 
discourse based on the idea that claims for using 
tax resources to fund efforts within national 
boundaries are political as opposed to moral — 
that is, they are not based on economic merit. If we 
take redistribution as a moral imperative 
seriously, we must put the greater international 
need above national, political demands.
Section IV considers the practical implications 
of this analysis in the context of the latest iteration 
of the OECD’s base erosion and profit-shifting 
initiative, known as BEPS 2.0. The OECD’s work 
program is aimed at revising the existing 
structure of profit allocation as well as the nexus 
rules, efforts that may generate a novel set of 
international tax rules.
Section V assesses the political philosophical 
arguments for and against global distributive 
justice. It considers the cases of cosmopolitans, 
realists, nationalists, and Rawlsians.8 The article 
concludes that the complex interplay of political, 
economic, and social cooperation in the 21st 
century requires an urgent reevaluation of the 
way in which distributive justice is and should be 
practiced.
6
OECD, “Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to 
the Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalisation of the Economy” 
(May 2019) (hereinafter, work program).
7
Morality is itself a contentious term. This article contends that its 
moral force works on any of a utilitarian, Kantian, or Aristotelian 
definition.
8
From the works of John Rawls, an American political philosopher 
(1921-2002), discussed in greater detail infra notes 90-93, Rawlsian 
justice, broadly speaking, revolves around the idea that differences in 
society are largely a legacy of luck. In order to determine how political 
institutions ought to be arranged, Rawls proposes that differences in 
society ought only to be tolerated insofar as they improve the position of 
the weakest members. Rawls does not suggest that “society” should be 
viewed from a global perspective; this article suggests otherwise.
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The final section considers whether there is 
any continuing moral value in redistribution to 
address relative poverty within national borders 
absent the resources and political will to also 
address absolute poverty internationally, and 
concludes that there is none. It also yields insight 
into the motives of those with wealth and power 
who choose to share only as much of their wealth 
as may be necessary to prevent the less wealthy in 
their vicinity from forcibly seizing wealth and 
power.
II. Tax Justice
Everyone believes in justice. After all, who 
will publicly declare a goal of injustice? The term 
has found its way into the names of tax lobbying 
groups such as the Tax Justice Network and 
Global Alliance for Tax Justice. Their aims, 
however, are highly political and their 
perspectives often differ from other lobbying 
groups that invoke their own (politically 
informed) perspective on justice. Likewise, it is 
difficult to imagine there are many economic 
agents who would express their desire not to pay 
their “fair share.” Language as loose as “fair 
share” can mean such different things to different 
people that it ends up not really meaning 
anything beyond expressing the political 
predilections of the utterer. To a multinational 
enterprise’s board of directors, the terms “justice” 
and “fair share” mean operating within the legal 
framework of the jurisdictions in which they 
operate.9 Others, as discussed below, have a very 
different perspective.
Given the politically charged nature of these 
terms, it is surprising how frequently those tasked 
with the administration of the tax system use 
them. For example, HM Revenue & Customs 
appears to substitute references to the amount of 
tax large businesses legally need to pay with the 
statement that they should pay their fair share10 — 
suggesting there are additional obligations 
beyond that which is legally necessary. When 
discussing cross-border tax arrangements, HMRC 
states that “the government supports a 
competitive corporate tax system but is clear that 
companies must pay their fair share.” Much of the 
difference, in HMRC’s view, relates to tax 
avoidance; however, it is far from clear that the 
definition is restricted to only that issue.
The IRS’s mission statement states that its role 
is to ensure the “minority who are unwilling to 
comply [with tax law] pay their fair share.”11 The 
violation of unambiguous tax laws constitutes 
noncompliance and evasion, but compliance is 
itself an ambiguous term. Compliance could also 
mean not structuring one’s affairs at the very 
limits of tax law ambiguity in a way that 
minimizes tax liability — that is, not engaging in 
tax avoidance.12 Tax avoidance is a far more 
difficult concept than tax evasion since avoidance 
depends on an accepted understanding of the 
legislative intent underlying ambiguous tax law 
language. While the United States relates fairness 
— a term explored in greater depth in Section III 
— back to legality as opposed to more politically 
driven notions of justice or fairness, those notions 
control the activities of the IRS as it responds to 
the legislative will. Those ideals also influence the 
legislature and tax administrators when they 
decide to respond to planning by eliminating 
ambiguity or decide not to act, although the latter 
can also occur because the authorities lack the 
resources to respond immediately as tax planners 
continuously devise structures at the limits of the 
law.
A recently disclosed sophisticated tax 
planning scheme involving so-called “cum-cum” 
and “cum-ex” share trading exemplifies the 
tension between tax planning within the law and 
violations of the law. Germany did not expressly 
outlaw transactions that enabled German 
9
See, e.g., Apple, “The Facts About Apple’s Tax Payments” (Nov. 6, 
2017). How corporations ought to behave is far from a settled matter. 
Milton Friedman argues that directors-as-individuals may have their 
own personal political and moral views, but their legal duties require 
them to operate in accordance with the law and their fiduciary duties 
require them to maximize shareholder value. Friedman, “The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Enhance Its Profits,” 32(13) The New York 
Times Magazine 122 (Sept. 3, 1970). Others disagree with this, suggesting 
that corporate social responsibility is in the interest of a wider group of 
stakeholders that directors ought to consider. See Judith Freedman, “Tax 
and Corporate Responsibility,” 695 Tax J. (Jan. 1, 2003).
10
HMRC, supra note 5.
11
IRS, supra note 5.
12
Henry Ordower, “The Culture of Tax Avoidance,” 55 Saint Louis U. 
L.J. 47 (2010).
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taxpayers to claim a credit for a dividend 
withholding tax that was not actually paid on 
shares that non-Germans owned and lent or sold 
short to Germans near the ex-dividend date that 
were then returned to the non-German owner, 
and it permitted both the owner of shares and the 
buyer of the shorted shares to claim the German 
credit for dividend withholding.13 It is difficult to 
imagine how two taxpayers paying their “fair 
share” can receive a refund of the same tax. 
Nevertheless, because the scheme was not made 
expressly illegal, one might argue that claiming 
the refund was compliant with the tax law and 
thus consistent with tax justice.
While it is understandable that tax authorities 
want to reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance, it 
seems reasonable to expect their role to be 
restricted to the apolitical realm — that is, limited 
to their legal fiat. On this analysis, moral 
questions about justice and one’s fair share should 
be restricted to the political realm.
However, it also seems legitimate for political 
lobbying groups to argue in favor of a particular 
political or moral position even if this means 
claiming that their use of terms like “fair share” is 
not a legal prescription, but rather a normative 
expression. Tax Justice UK, for example, asserts 
that “large companies in the UK do not contribute 
their fair share of tax to the exchequer.”14 The 
group acknowledges that when it uses the term 
“fair share,” it means businesses should pay more 
tax than they owe. Tax Justice UK encourages 
public review of the cost-benefit analysis used to 
draft corporate reliefs and subsidies; it hopes to 
see an abandonment of the ideology of tax 
competition, a tightening of efforts to reduce 
avoidance, and better enforcement. Once again, it 
difficult to imagine that many would disagree 
with the idea that economic agents should pay 
what they legally owe, but it is far from clear that 
justice requires paying more — although it is clear 
that the terminology is political and cannot easily 
be characterized objectively.
There are cogent, albeit contested, arguments 
in favor of the idea that increases in corporate tax 
lead to reductions in overall tax yield.15 If true, this 
would appear to harm those reliant on tax 
revenue and reduce the welfare of everyone in the 
system. Assuming, however, that increases in 
taxation did lead to increases in tax revenue, what 
would that mean in terms of justice? For many on 
the communitarian end of the political spectrum, 
justice would require increases in taxation. They 
would claim that vital public services are 
underfunded,16 noting that there are significant 
welfare needs throughout the public sector and 
increasing reliance on food banks.17 Looking at the 
United Kingdom as an example, they would 
argue that the National Health Service (NHS) is in 
a permanent crisis; education is underfunded; 
teachers, doctors, and nurses are not paid enough; 
local authority services have been cut; and that the 
whole austerity enterprise has created 
devastation and misery since the financial crisis in 
2008.18 The point being made here is that there are 
many academics, lobby groups, and other 
organizations actively making moral claims for 
more money (that is, demanding scarce resources 
from the state for the alleviation of relative 
poverty without reference to the demands of 
absolute poverty). What is clear from these 
sources is that they all attempt to dress their 
demands as moral claims as opposed to 
straightforward political or economic bargaining 
requests. Use of the word “crisis” is prevalent, 
indicating that unless their demands are met, 
something “terrible” will happen to the public, 
which requires immediate attention.
Based on this analysis, the demands of justice 
require increases in public services that have a 
redistributional effect and are paid for by taxing 
those who can comfortably afford to pay more.19 
The argument, put in these terms, is one based on 
13
Lee A. Sheppard, “Anticipating EU Tax Haven Hybrid Rules,” Tax 
Notes Int’l, Sept. 23, 2019, p. 1217.
14
Tax Justice UK, supra note 5.
15
See, e.g., Richard Teather, “The Effect of Labour’s Corporation Tax,” 
Adam Smith Institute blog, May 12, 2017; Alex Brill and Kevin A. 
Hassett, “Revenue-Maximizing Corporate Income Taxes: The Laffer 
Curve in OECD Countries,” AEI Working Paper No. 137 (2007); and Joel 
Slemrod, “Chapter 6: On the High-Income Laffer Curve,” in Tax 
Progressivity and Income Inequality (1996).
16
Kam Gill, “Austerity Won’t Be Over Until Our Public Services Get 
the Funding They Need,” TUC blog, Oct. 26, 2018.
17
Rachel Loopstra et al., “Austerity, Sanctions, and the Rise of Food 
Banks in the UK,” The BMJ Online blog, Apr. 8, 2015.
18
Sophie Arie, “Austerity in the UK: Rising Poverty Threatens 
Stability and Health,” The BMJ Online blog, Nov. 19, 2018.
19
Chris Giles and Delphine Strauss, “Costs Soars for Labour’s Grand 
Pledge to Reshape the Economy,” The Financial Times, Sept. 2, 2019.

































 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648413
VIEWPOINT
102  TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, JULY 6, 2020
justice and fairness: After all, shouldn’t a country 
as wealthy as the United Kingdom provide 
minimum levels of public services?20 An issue that 
arises, however, is how to define the acceptable 
minimum. How much resource redistribution 
should the state engage in? Is there a level of 
comfort beyond which the state can say that 
further intervention to narrow wealth distribution 
is beyond its mandate? To understand this issue, 
one must consider the problems of relative versus 
absolute poverty.21
A. Absolute Poverty: Analysis
In 2015 it was estimated that around 10 
percent of the world’s population — more than 
700 million people — were living in conditions of 
actual poverty.22 Childhood deaths are one of the 
threats of absolute global poverty.
In 2018 the World Health Organization 
estimated that 6.2 million children and 
adolescents under the age of 15 died from 
preventable causes.23 The leading causes of 
childhood deaths were preterm birth 
complications, pneumonia, birth asphyxia, 
congenital anomalies, diarrhea, and malaria. The 
WHO suggests that:
more than half of these early child deaths 
are preventable or can be treated with 
simple, affordable interventions including 
immunization, adequate nutrition, safe 
water and food and appropriate care by a 
trained health provider.
Goal number one in the U.N.’s sustainable 
development goals is to “end poverty in all its 
forms everywhere.” Outside of our hypothetical 
Village of Billionaires, having a job does not 
guarantee a decent living. Discussing this goal, 
the U.N. cites some sobering statistics for 2018 
(although there is little reason to believe there has 
been major change in two years). Worldwide, 8 
percent of employed workers and their families 
lived in extreme poverty. For ages 24-34, there 
were 122 women living in extreme poverty for 
every 100 men. The majority of those who were 
living on less than $1.90 per day were in sub-
Saharan Africa. One in five children lived in 
extreme poverty. Fifty-five percent of the world’s 
population had no access to social protection. 
Only 41 percent of women giving birth in 2018 
received maternity benefits.
At the same time, as the world is facing the 
very real problem of absolute poverty, developed 
countries like the United Kingdom are devoting 
large amounts of money to far different 
priorities. In the United Kingdom, John 
McDonnell, Labour shadow chancellor24 from 
2010 to 2015, argued that the provision of 
Universal Basic Services is consistent with 
Labour’s belief in universalism and the 
importance of the services we all share.25 
Estimates suggest that in 2014 the United 
Kingdom spent more than £5 billion on benefits 
for those with incomes that exceeded £100,000 per 
annum (about $6.22 billion and $124,000, 
respectively).26 According to one report, in 2018 
the U.K.’s foreign aid budget came to around £14 
billion with £1.75 million going toward paying 
bonuses to civil servants, including £243,000 for 
top officials.27 In excess of £400 million of the U.K. 
government’s money is spent on its arts and 
entertainment program, which includes funding 
for lavish productions at the Royal Opera House.28 
The Sovereign Grant, which maintains the Queen, 
the royal family, and their palaces, came to a total 
of £82.2 million for 2018-2019.29 In 2019 the Labour 
20
Sven-Olof Lodin, “Swedish Tax Reforms 1071-77 — Why So 
Many?” 56 Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis Studia Juridica 
Stockholmiensia 181 (1977) (observing that building the welfare state 
required the bulk of taxes to be imposed on the middle class, but steeply 
progressive rates applicable to wealthy taxpayers were necessary to 
ensure that the middle class would accept the plan).
21
See U.N., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
22
Zack Beauchamp, “The World’s Victory Over Extreme Poverty in 
One Chart,” Vox, Dec. 14, 2014.
23
WHO, “Children: Reducing Mortality” (Sept. 2019).
24
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines shadow 
chancellor as “the politician in the main opposition party in the British 
parliament who would become chancellor etc. if their party was in 
government, and who is responsible for speaking on the same subjects.”
25
Ordower, “Uniform International Tax Collection for Global 
Development, a *(**)topian BEPS Alternative” (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author).
26
Taxpayers’ Alliance, “New Bumper Book of Government Waste 
Exposes £120 Billion of Wasteful Spending — That’s £4,500 for Every 
Household in the UK” (June 15, 2014).
27
David Wilcock, “Staff in Charge of the UK’s £14 Billion Foreign Aid 
Budget Shared £1.75 Million in Bonuses Last Year Including £10,000P to 
Senior Civil Servants,” Daily Mail, Aug. 12, 2019.
28
The Arts Council England, “How We Invest Public Money” (2018).
29
Deputy Treasurer to the Queen, “The Sovereign Grant and 
Sovereign Grant Reserve” (Mar. 2019).
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Party proposed increasing U.K. government 
expenditure on public services by around £80 
billion in addition to the £800 billion already 
devoted to those services.30
The Labour Party’s vision for international 
development is set out in a document entitled, “A 
World for the Many, Not the Few.” It states:
The Labour Party stands ready to lead the 
transition to a fairer world. The singular 
mission of international development 
under Labour will be to build a world for 
the many, not the few. Labour will 
wholeheartedly back the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) as a 
progressive route to building that world.31
In spite of government spending 
commitments totaling more than £800 billion and 
in spite of the Labour leadership being among the 
most egalitarian Western political parties, the 
government only proposes directing 70 pence out 
of every £100 made in the United Kingdom 
toward eradicating absolute poverty — a 
commitment that had already been met by the 
center-right Conservative administration.32 
Instead, the country spends its vast tax revenue on 
its royal family, with their private jets, fine wines, 
and royal palaces; opera performances; and 
welfare handouts to those with incomes in excess 
of £100,000 per year — an approach to global 
poverty that is similar to other countries in the 
OECD.
The United States doesn’t have a monarchy or 
royal palaces to maintain. The White House is 
merely a cottage in comparison with the grand 
palaces of the United Kingdom. Salaries for 
government officials remain modest relative to 
those of highly compensated corporate 
executives. The president receives $400,000 per 
year plus expenses, certainly well above the 
average of $45,000 for American workers, but far 
below the income earned by CEOs of major 
corporations who often earn in excess of $50 
million annually.33 Direct government support for 
the arts has disappeared almost entirely in the 
United States, but indirect support through an 
income tax deduction for charitable contributions 
is a significant benefit that lacks any meaningful 
government oversight. Excluding donations to 
healthcare and education, the expected cost of 
providing tax breaks to donors for charitable 
contributions will exceed $555 billion for the 10-
year period from 2019 to 2028.34 Many income tax 
expenditures inure primarily to the benefit of 
high-income or high-net-worth taxpayers in the 
United States, including the stepped-up new 
“basis at death” rule (an estimated $222 billion 
expenditure for 2019 to 2028) and preferential 
rates for long-term capital gains (estimated to cost 
more than $1.5 trillion from 2019 to 2028).35 
Proposals from some of the former candidates for 
the 2020 Democratic Party nomination for 
president would have made the United States 
more like the United Kingdom in terms of the 
universal provision of benefits with plans 
including providing Medicare to all and free 
college tuition36 or a universal basic income.37 The 
presumptive Democratic presidential nominee 
Joe Biden’s plans are far more tame and 
traditional. His policy proposals emphasize 
support for jobs through unions, environmental 
improvement, and infrastructure projects for 
roads, railroads, broadband, and airports.38
The total U.S. budget for 2020 is estimated to 
be more than $4.6 trillion (not including the 
extraordinary expenditures associated with the 
ongoing economic relief from the COVID-19 
30
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31
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policy paper (Mar. 2018).
32
Richard Braham, “UK Spending on Foreign Aid,” Full Fact, Feb. 15, 
2018. See also DFID Media Room, “The Aid Budget Only Goes Up as the 
UK Economy Grows,” DFID in the News: Gov.UK Blog (Apr. 6, 2018).
33
See Kathleen Elkins, “Here’s the Last Time the President of the 
United States Got a Raise,” CNBC Make It, Feb. 19, 2018; and AFL-CIO, 
“Highest-Paid CEOs” (last accessed Mar. 1, 2020).
34
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qualified to receive charitable contributions. Most arts organizations do. 
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, “Tax 
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pandemic) with some $32 billion — 
approximately 60 cents out of every $100 spent — 
devoted to foreign assistance, which includes 
approximately $9 billion for “peace and security” 
(primarily stabilization efforts).39 Of the $4.6 
trillion, only $6.5 million is dedicated to 
humanitarian assistance, including migration 
management; $7 billion to health, with only $690 
million focused on maternal and children’s health; 
and a mere $2 billion for economic development, 
most of which takes the form of industry 
subsidies.
Even among the most socialistic of those who 
ran to be the 2020 Democratic presidential 
nominee, there was no discussion about 
substantially increasing the U.S. development 
budget to relieve world poverty — although 
section 170 of the U.S. tax code continues to offer 
a charitable contribution deduction for eligible 
taxpayers who contribute to U.S. charitable 
entities working to relieve world poverty. It also is 
clear that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused the 
United States to look even more inward. The first 
$2 trillion economic relief package did not include 
foreign aid.40 Also, the United States suspended 
funding for WHO and closed its borders to 
immigrants, except low-wage temporary workers 
needed to harvest crops and some specialized 
workers.
B. Relative Poverty: An Analysis
The parable that opens this article is designed 
to provoke. It is a reductio ad absurdum 
demonstrating how definitions of relative poverty 
fare when compared to the more serious issue of 
absolute poverty. The Village of Billionaires, 
however, is a modern tale about the differentials 
in global wealth and the way in which the 
language used by redistributionalists in 
developed economies has led to the appropriation 
of resources that, on any legitimate moral ground, 
could be dedicated to far more serious and 
pressing issues.
When considering questions of global 
inequality and redistribution, the key issue is not 
whether billionaires or multinationals ought to 
pay more, it is whether residents of the Village of 
Billionaires who are less affluent — or the less 
affluent residents of OECD countries — should 
expect that redistributed funds will accrue to 
them or to those who are far needier. The scale 
and scope of relative need compared with the real 
problem of absolute poverty is such that even 
some groups who claim to be in crisis and in 
desperate need themselves have a moral duty to 
redistribute their own assets toward the absolute 
poor as defined by the U.N. It is interesting to 
observe that individuals in developed economies 
who experience need (but not absolute poverty) 
demonstrate a greater willingness to share limited 
resources than is seen among the wealthy. On 
average, low-income individuals contribute a far 
higher percentage of their income to charities than 
high-income individuals.41
When comparing GDP per capita, per annum 
— a useful but imperfect comparison tool that 
materially overstates the resources at the lower 
end of the scale because, in all countries, 
distribution of GDP is skewed toward those with 
property and power — the EU averages about 
$43,700, with the United Kingdom’s coming in at 
$45,500, which also happens to be the OECD 
average.42 The United States stands at $62,600. The 
world’s poorest economies, such as Burundi, the 
Central African Republic, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Niger, Liberia, Malawi, and 
Mozambique, all have GDPs per capita below 
$1,500 a year.
According to GDP per capita data, which may 
change materially because of the worldwide 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the average 
person in the United Kingdom is more than 61 
times better off than the average person in 
Burundi, which has per capita GDP of only $744 
per year. Perhaps that method of assessment is too 
crude, and a better metric might be looking at 
how someone in the lower-income bracket in the 
39
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United Kingdom fares in comparison with 
someone in Burundi.
A single person with a disposable income of 
£169 per week (nearly £9,000 per year) with no 
children is considered to be in the lowest 10 
percent in the United Kingdom.43 That data set, 
however, does not take into account the range of 
other benefits and services available at no cost in 
the United Kingdom. Every pupil in the United 
Kingdom is entitled to around £5,000 per year for 
primary education and £6,300 per year for 
secondary education.44 The average per-person 
cost for the U.K.’s National Health Service comes 
in at around £3,000 per year.45 Averaged across all 
individuals, the low-income housing benefit 
amounts to approximately £5,000 annually.46 
Ultimately, someone with no job and no resources 
in the United Kingdom can reasonably expect to 
receive around £22,000 per annum in welfare, 
health, education, and housing benefits, which 
equates to around $28,000 annually — more than 
38 times the average per capita GDP in Burundi.
Perhaps even more surprising when 
comparing relative poverty with absolute poverty 
is the impact that removing national boundaries 
has on data sets. According to the Giving What 
We Can Global Rich List, which is run in 
collaboration with Care International, that income 
of £22,000 mentioned above places someone in the 
top 1.46 percent of the richest people in the world 
by income.47 Therefore, when compared against 
an international scale of income, the very poorest 
in the United Kingdom are among the richest in 
the world. The United Kingdom, on this analysis, 
is indeed the proverbial Village of Billionaires.
Most likely, the United States is also akin to 
the Village of Billionaires, although the welfare 
amount per capita is more difficult to measure for 
the bottom wealth segment, which may be 
needier than that segment in the United 
Kingdom. The United States lacks universal 
healthcare but does offer Medicaid, a healthcare 
program for low-income individuals and families 
administered by the states,48 and Medicare for 
older U.S. citizens and residents who paid, or 
whose spouses paid, the Medicare tax for at least 
40 calendar quarters.49 Free public elementary and 
secondary education is available for all 
authorized U.S. residents and many unauthorized 
residents, although rules and funding amounts 
vary by state. Some public housing and housing 
assistance is available, but it is not universal. Even 
the basic retirement benefit under Social Security 
is, like Medicare, eligibility-based.50
Other benefits are available, including 
temporary assistance for needy families51 and the 
supplemental nutrition assistance program (food 
stamps),52 but again, eligibility is not universal. 
The largest welfare benefit — supplemental 
income provided through the refundable earned 
income tax credit — is a function of the 
individual’s income from wages or other earnings, 
so unemployed individuals do not share in the 
benefit. Set forth in section 32, the EITC is 
estimated to be a $49 billion tax expenditure over 
the decade beginning in 2019.53
Returning to the United Kingdom, in a Labour 
press release, McDonnell refers to the top 1 
percent as the “super rich.” He says:
It’s shocking that so many of the top 1 
percent are getting tax advantages. . . . A 
Labour government will be for the many, 
not the few — and will tackle regional 
inequality, introduce a fairer taxation 
system, and clamp down on tax 
advantages exploited by the super-rich.54
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Looking at the United Kingdom from a global 
perspective, however, the data suggest that even 
the people to whom he is looking to redistribute 
tax advantages are among the superrich. They are, 
ultimately, “the few,” not “the many.” On a global 
scale, McDonnell’s proposals merely take from 
the top 1 percent of the top 1 percent and 
redistribute to the world’s top 1 percent. On any 
reasonable analysis, if based on a wider global 
perspective, this is not egalitarian. It is simply the 
expression of political power within a wealthy 
jurisdiction to redistribute money from the 
fabulously wealthy to the simply wealthy. When 
McDonnell talks about regional inequality, why 
restrict the discussion to regions within the U.K. 
borders? Why not acknowledge that the United 
Kingdom itself is just a region within a global 
community?
In 2019 the Institute for Fiscal Studies reported 
that in order for a U.K. taxpayer to find 
themselves in the top 1 percent of income earners, 
they would have to earn £160,000 per year.55 By 
way of contrast, reaching the top 0.1 percent of 
income earners required earning around 
£650,000. The levels of inequality faced by income 
earners between 0.1 and 1 percent is higher than 
any other part of the income spectrum. However, 
recalling the Village of Billionaires, it is as absurd 
to suggest a redistribution of income from the top 
0.1 percent of U.K. income earners to the top 1 
percent of income earners in the name of 
egalitarianism56 as it is to suggest that the top 1 
percent of global income earners ought to receive 
the level of benefits they receive from the top 0.1 
percent of global income earners. Egalitarianism 
must face this problem if it is going to be a serious 
moral force in the world, rather than representing 
the narrow interests of a small but lucky group of 
people who happen to have been born in a 
particular geographic location.
Conceptually, the system has created a 
problematic moral dilemma — one not 
anticipated by those within the OECD village 
unless and until they look outside its walls. With 
the problem noted, the discussion can turn to how 
one can distinguish genuine egalitarian claims 
from narrow political claims made by the 
privileged few who, because of where they were 
born, can claim significant benefits in large 
welfare economies.
III. Economic vs. Egalitarian Discourse
Recognizing the problem with claims for 
resource allocation in the context of relative as 
opposed to absolute poverty, this section 
considers whether redistributional claims made 
in the name of “fairness” fulfill egalitarian aims if 
they are restricted to within national boundaries. 
The following discussion involving international 
wage arbitrage sharpens the focus to lay the 
groundwork for considering fairness in the 
context of international tax.
Fairness is a quintessentially relative term. 
Suggesting that a particular state of affairs — X — 
is unfair requires an explanation. Why is X unfair? 
It must be unfair relative to some other state of 
affairs — Y — that is fair.
If one is talking about wages, for example, a 
fair wage should be relative to some situation in 
which the wage paid is unfair, and that judgment 
must be based on some kind of reasoning. The 
comparator group is clearly important. One 
person earning £8 per hour in London might be 
said to be receiving and unfair wage relative to 
someone earning £5,000 per hour for doing the 
same work. Why should one person get paid 
more than another for the same thing? This 
reasoning is applied in discrimination legislation, 
which outlaws paying one person less because of 
a protected characteristic such as gender, race, 
and age. The U.K. Equality Act 2010 is just one 
example. Notably, like other discrimination laws, 
it does not, as we shall see below, apply between 
jurisdictions. There also may be regional 
variations within a jurisdiction, although those 
tend to be a function of the cost of living. How 
does one consider the fairness of a wage of £8 per 
hour in one country versus a group that might be 
making £8 per week elsewhere?
Claims of fairness are frequently made by 
groups within a jurisdiction or a region seeking to 
advance their economic or political position. 
Trade unions, for example, often use the term “fair 
55
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pay” to advance an economic demand for higher 
wages and improved conditions for their workers. 
The fair pay being demanded by certain trade 
unions, however, is not the sort of fairness that 
matters in a more traditional Marxist analysis.
Take, for example, the demands of the British 
Airline Pilots Association (BALPA), a pilots’ 
union, in a recent call for a strike against British 
Airways. The airline’s pilots were dissatisfied 
with an offer to increase their £167,000 per annum 
salaries by 11.5 percent to around £186,000. The 
union declared that the pilots wanted more 
because the company was making large profits, 
describing the demands as “fair and 
reasonable.”57 BALPA was not concerned by the 
inequality between its members and the cabin 
crew (who earned between £16,000 and £27,000), 
instead focusing the claim of fairness on the £1.3 
million salary afforded to the chief executive 
officer.58
Can a pilot earning over £185,000 a year really 
be considered to be suffering from unfairness in 
the egalitarian sense? It seems reasonable to 
assume that those making demands of this sort — 
demands that they present as issues of fairness — 
are in fact simply economic agents using their 
collective ability to disrupt business to enrich 
themselves. These demands are not really 
examples of egalitarianism at work; rather, they 
show the exercise of economic power.
In classic Marxist theory, as discussed below, 
fairness is central to organizing labor markets. 
This ubiquitous term suffers from a problem 
when one removes national boundaries and 
considers fairness across an international 
spectrum. Friedrich Engels suggests that:
the produce of the workman’s labour goes 
to the Capitalist, and the workman gets 
out of it no more than the bare necessaries 
of life. And thus the end of this 
uncommonly “fair” race of competition is 
that the produce of the labour of those 
who do work, gets unavoidably 
accumulated in the hands of those that do 
not work, and becomes in their hands the 
most powerful means to enslave the very 
men who produced it.59
Writing in the late 19th century, Engels might 
be forgiven for simplifying the complex 
relationship between rewards afforded to one 
who risks capital in developing new, uncertain 
enterprises (that is, equity capital) and returns 
afforded to capital provided on a lower risk basis 
(for example, interest on a loan). However, in the 
context of an international economy, the concept 
of fairness needs to be further explored.
Consider the way in which the advantages of 
international trade, specifically that which 
involves international labor arbitrage, accrue and 
to whom. Labor arbitrage occurs when a company 
elects to move its workforce to a country where 
wages are lower and the overall cost of doing 
business is reduced. One of the most successful 
companies to engage in international labor 
arbitrage is Associated British Foods, the holding 
company that owns Primark. Primark, a huge 
MNE in its own right with more than 75,000 
employees around the world, sells a range of 
fashion and homeware items to stores in 
developed economies. The company has been 
hailed as an enormous success; according to its 
2019 annual revenue numbers, it sells around £7.8 
billion of its products, generating a pretax profit 
of around £913 million.60 For investors, however, 
the returns have not been spectacular. Over the 
last 10 years, an investor would have received 
dividend income of around 1.6 percent, and their 
capital would have increased by around 7 percent 
per annum on a compound basis.61 This compares 
with a risk-free return on the 10-year U.K. 
government bond yield of about 5 percent over 
the same period.62
From an investor’s perspective, returns that 
only exceed those from a risk-free investment in 
government bonds by 3.6 percent have been 
adequate, but they are fairly pedestrian when 
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compared with other large companies.63 Who, 
then, has benefited the most from Primark’s 
spectacular rise? The consumer. Primark’s 
consumer demographic, which is at the lower end 
of the developed economy’s labor market, has 
benefited from lower prices that Primark has 
achieved using labor arbitrage. In other words, 
the relatively poor are benefiting at the expense of 
the absolute poor. As Richard Hyman, an ex-
director of market research firm Mintel pointed 
out:
There has been a lot of justifiably bad 
publicity about ethical sourcing, paying 
people a pittance and all that, but I am 
afraid the truth is that comfortable 
middle-class people may be able to adopt 
the moral high ground, but most people 
can’t.64
In 2008 an investigation into Primark revealed 
that the firm had been benefiting from child labor 
with workers as young as 11.65 Investigators found 
that workers in India were being paid as little as 
the equivalent to 60 pence per day. By way of 
contrast, the national living wage in the United 
Kingdom, applicable to workers age 25 and older, 
rose to £8.72 as of April 2020.66 These figures, 
however, underestimate the benefits that 
individuals living in modern, developed welfare 
economies receive, as discussed in the previous 
section.
Consumers in developed economies saw the 
price of apparel drop about 4.25 percent from 
2000 to 2019.67 Compare that with the U.K. 
consumer price index’s growth of around 67 
percent over the same period. Who has benefited 
from, to use Engel’s term, the workman’s labor? 
Based on the data, the lower-income brackets in 
developed economies.
What the analysis above shows is that use of 
economic bargaining groups within well-off 
nationalities, including even the poorest in those 
societies, will not result in a cogent egalitarian 
redistribution. Compare the minimum wage in 
the United Kingdom with the sorts of wages being 
paid in, for example, Bangladesh68 — on an hourly 
basis, that is £8.72 versus around 45 pence. In 
those circumstances, where would the tax on the 
profits of, for example, Primark be allocated in a 
fair global economy? Should we look to increase 
the tax revenue allocated to the U.K. where 
Primark has its head office and the annual 
government revenue amounts to about $1 trillion, 
or to Bangladesh where it produces many of the 
goods that it sells and the annual government 
revenue amounts to about $24 billion?
If international government welfare budgets 
and international wages were taken into account 
when considering the nebulous term “fairness,” 
how can we possibly argue in favor of increasing 
developed countries’ demands for tax revenue? 
Surely any egalitarian can only advocate for a 
large-scale redistribution toward the low-wage 
and low-government-welfare economies in which 
many MNEs operate.
IV. BEPS 2.0
The work program produced by the OECD in 
May 2019 was approved by 129 members of the 
inclusive framework. It sought to resolve issues 
that members believed the initial BEPS package 
failed to address and to limit what appeared to be 
a proliferation of unilateral actions by individual 
jurisdictions.
The work program’s proposals rest on two 
pillars that form what is commonly referred to as 
BEPS 2.0. The first pillar seeks to reallocate taxing 
rights toward countries that control the users or 
consumers (the market jurisdiction). The second 
pillar is designed to address the residual 
problems relating to BEPS risk, specifically the 
problem of profits being allocated to countries 
with no or low taxation. The focus of the second 
63
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pillar is the global anti-base-erosion (GLOBE) 
proposal. Paragraph 54 of the work program 
explains that a key aim of GLOBE is:
to stop a harmful race to the bottom, 
which otherwise risks shifting taxes to 
fund public goods onto less mobile bases 
including labour and consumption, 
effectively undermining the tax 
sovereignty of nations and their elected 
legislators.
The proposal continues to suggest that it is 
often developing countries that offer those tax 
incentives to try and recruit economic activity in 
their jurisdictions. The document states this often 
harms those developing countries and that the 
GLOBE proposals could:
effectively shield developing countries 
from the pressure to offer inefficient 
incentives and in doing so help them in 
better mobilising domestic resources by 
ensuring that they will be able to 
effectively tax returns on investment made 
in their countries.
The proposals, which are in keeping with the 
general principles surrounding the wider BEPS 
project, focus on tackling international tax 
arbitrage and preventing companies from using 
the international system to erode the tax base of 
higher-tax jurisdictions by placing profits in low- 
or no-tax jurisdictions.
The OECD suggests that pillar 2:
seeks to develop rules that would provide 
jurisdictions with a right to “tax back” 
where other jurisdictions have not 
exercised their primary taxing rights or 
the payment is otherwise subject to low 
levels of effective taxation.69
Notably, this statement makes no reference to 
whether the state that has the right to tax must 
take into account whether it is appropriate to do 
so. For example, is it appropriate for a wealthy 
country with high tax and a comprehensive 
welfare system to take advantage of this tax back 
even if it is to the detriment of a poorer nation?
The U.S. system has long given rise to 
concerns of this sort, and other OECD members 
have criticized the United States because of its 
worldwide taxation of domestic taxpayers 
described in Treas. reg. section 1.1-1(b). While U.S. 
individuals and entities are subject to tax in the 
U.S. on all income from all sources, the United 
States cedes primary taxing authority to the 
country in which the income is generated through 
a foreign tax credit. The amount of the credit is the 
lesser of the amount of tax properly paid in the 
foreign jurisdiction or the amount of U.S. tax 
attributable to the income produced in that 
jurisdiction. By capturing the excess of the U.S. tax 
over the foreign tax, the United States frustrates 
any attempt by developing jurisdictions to use tax 
concessions to encourage investment of capital in 
that jurisdiction. Some discussions suggested that 
an exclusive tax savings clause in the governing 
tax treaty could limit taxes to those imposed 
where the economic activity takes place and 
prevent the United States and other jurisdictions 
from claiming tax that the developing economy 
intentionally relinquished to attract capital 
investment.
In the past, U.S. persons could temporarily 
avoid the U.S. tax by operating through a foreign 
entity (other than one that is tax transparent for 
U.S. tax purposes, like a partnership). Under that 
regime, which had been detailed in sections 901 
and 902, repatriation of foreign-source income 
was taxable in the United States — that is, U.S. tax 
applied (with direct and indirect credits for 
foreign taxes paid) when the foreign entity 
distributed funds to its U.S. owner. However, U.S. 
tax legislation enacted in 2017 (the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97)) substantially eliminated the 
tax on distributions from a foreign corporation to 
its U.S. corporate shareholders through the 100 
percent dividends received deduction in section 
245A. This aligns the U.S. tax structure for 
corporations and their subsidiaries with the 
territorial tax systems characteristic of the United 
Kingdom and the member states of the EU. Given 
the long-standing criticism of U.S. exceptionalism 
and its worldwide taxation, it is ironic that the 
BEPS project is now initiating a tax back 
conversation to prevent the supposed race to the 
bottom.
For all the talk in connection with the BEPS 
project about undermining the “fairness and 
69
OECD, “OECD Secretariat Invites Public Input on the Global Anti-
Base Erosion (GloBE) Proposal Under Pillar Two” (Nov. 8, 2019).
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integrity of our tax systems,”70 the project does not 
address the far bigger issue of where any 
additional tax ought to go in accordance with an 
egalitarian analysis. Instead, BEPS 2.0 focuses on 
quantifying the profits subject to the new taxing 
rights, designing a nexus rule that is not 
constrained by physical location, and issues 
relating to implementation and administration.
Perhaps the OECD’s proposals to consider a 
minimum rate of tax might address some of these 
issues. The OECD states that:
a minimum tax rate on all income reduces 
the incentive for taxpayers to engage in 
profit shifting and establishes a floor for 
tax competition among jurisdictions.71
The problem with this proposal, however, lies 
in the fact that minimum levels of taxation 
imposed on MNEs may simply lead to head-office 
jurisdiction shopping — to some extent, it already 
has when taking into account, for example, 
Ireland’s ultralow corporation tax.72 It is difficult 
to see a minimum tax falling below the Irish 
corporate tax rate. Further, the GLOBE proposal is 
largely targeted at solving specific issues 
pertaining to the digital economy along with 
ancillary and perennial issues such as those 
relating to the taxation of permanent 
establishments and foreign branches. The type of 
problems the OECD is addressing do not come 
close to the changes that must be made if the 
world decides to take international wealth, 
income, and tax resource inequality seriously. For 
international inequality to be addressed in a 
meaningful way, taxation rights and revenue 
would need to be allocated with wholesale 
redistribution of resources across the world in 
mind and without regard to any other 
consideration. Judging by the pending OECD 
proposals, this sort of redistribution is not on the 
near horizon.
The proposal here is straightforward. If the 
technical debate surrounding BEPS 2.0 proceeds 
as expected, jurisdictions should refrain from 
using terms such as “fairness” and “justice” in 
presenting their case. The debate should proceed 
solely on the premise that there are multiple 
parties with varying interests and degrees of 
political and economic power, and they all fully 
intend on expressing that power to further their 
desired individual welfare. The international 
forum for tax agreements between countries is 
rather like the Hobbesian state of nature73: There is 
no overarching Leviathan who can determine the 
rules and arbitrate disputes. Instead, the mutual 
and complementary self-interests of the 
participants and the expression of power will 
ultimately drive the outcome.
Evidence suggests that, at least in the debate 
surrounding BEPS, the OECD’s deliberations and 
consultations are really an effort to referee the 
sparring match among international economic 
powers. It is not about justice or fairness — rather, 
it is about distributing power across wealthy 
nations. States with high-tax, high-spend 
economies were poised to explore unilateral 
action, particularly in the form of digital services 
taxes, which disproportionately affected U.S. 
internet corporations. By spring of 2020 at least 14 
countries had either enacted DSTs or made plans 
to do so: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom.74
For example, the 3 percent DST that France 
passed in July 2019 targeted around 30 large 
technology businesses, including Facebook, 
Amazon, and Google.75 The tax applied to firms 
with revenues of greater than €750 million that 
were generated from “digital activities,” 
including revenue greater than €25 million in 
France. The United States immediately launched 
an investigation suggesting France’s DST unfairly 
targeted U.S. interests. President Trump also 
suggested that the imposition of the DST might 
result in retaliatory tariffs on a number of French 
70
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(July 20, 2013) (remarks given at the G-20 finance ministers’ meeting in 
Moscow).
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products sold into the U.S. market, including 
wine. In an unedifying display of diplomacy, 
Trump described French President Emmanuel 
Macron’s decision to press ahead with the DST as 
“foolishness,” while French Finance Minister 
Bruno La Maire urged the United States to avoid 
mixing the DST debate with general trade policy.76 
By the end of August 2019 the United States and 
France had reached a compromise. Under the 
teams of the deal, France agreed to scrap its DST 
once a new international levy had been agreed 
upon at the OECD level.
Despite the compromise with France, the 
U.S.’s aggressive approach to international trade 
led to a ruling in its favor allowing it to impose 
$7.5 billion of countermeasures against European 
goods.77 This ruling arose as a result of European 
subsidies to Airbus, which the WTO agreed had 
caused harm to the U.S. economy over several 
decades.
The economic negotiations surrounding how 
countries trade and tax each other’s goods and 
services will no doubt continue. It appears likely 
that multilateral institutions such as the WTO and 
the OECD will help ensure rules-based systems 
remain in place and allow trade to flourish. But 
are these international rules-based institutions 
truly dispensing justice and fairness? We would 
argue, at least from an egalitarian perspective, 
that the answer is no.
We believe that terms like “fairness” or 
“justice” should be reserved for actions or 
discussions that involve a global understanding 
of inequality, and we respectfully assert that this is 
the only cogent position that an egalitarian can 
honestly take. Lobbying groups, trade unions, 
and domestic political bodies have devoted large 
amounts of time and resources purporting to 
advance socialism, but instead they merely 
advanced the narrow, parochial, and regional 
interests of their members. They have focused on 
the economic and political well-being of their 
small constituent groups, arguing for advancing 
the global top 1 percent at the expense of the 
global 0.1 percent.
True communitarians must feel regret when 
they recognize there is another 99 percent living 
outside their Village of Billionaires. If they truly 
care about justice and fairness, the mission starts 
and finishes with this acknowledgment.
V. Global Distributive Justice
The Village of Billionaires parable 
demonstrates the absurdity of limiting 
redistribution to a small and privileged 
community. This section examines why the 
arguments in favor of global redistributive justice 
have comprehensively failed to gain traction.
As we have noted, those arguing for a narrow 
domestic redistribution wealth are not doing so 
based on morality or fairness — rather, this 
position is simply an expression of power. The 
proponents’ interests are defined by virtue of the 
power they hold.78 Kenneth Waltz argues that the 
system of international relations is akin to 
anarchy with no central agent enforcing the 
rules.79 This realist perspective helps to explain 
why hopes for fairness or justice are unlikely to 
result in practical arrangements that reflect 
morality. Setting aside the realists’ concerns about 
practical application, if a fair system could be 
introduced, what would it involve?
Many thinkers, including a group known as 
cosmopolitans, have considered this question. In 
“Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Peter Singer 
poses a thought experiment, asking what moral 
responsibility may arise if, while on the way to 
work, someone discovers a child drowning in a 
pond.80 Singer concludes that the inconvenience 
of getting wet and dirty can never outweigh the 
possible loss of a child’s life. We suggest there is a 
parallel between that situation and the obligations 
we face when we are aware of the extreme, 
absolute poverty that many suffer from around 
the world.
Other cosmopolitan thinkers have discussed 
these issues since Singer published his article in 
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1972.81 Broadly, the cosmopolitan theory revolves 
around three essential elements, which Thomas 
Pogge sets out in several of his works.82 The first 
element identifies individuals, as opposed to 
family, cultures, or religions as the correct unit of 
concern. The second element requires 
universality, meaning there can be no 
discrimination of gender, race, or age. Finally, 
there is a requirement of generality so that all 
people ought to have concern for all other people 
equally, removing national, religious, and cultural 
ties. In the end, the cosmopolitans adhere to the 
golden rule, an imperative with a long, rich 
heritage.83
Even within the cosmopolitan community, 
there is disagreement about how a universal, 
nondiscriminatory distribution might take place. 
Martha Nussbaum, for example, argues that “it is 
right to give the local an additional measure of 
concern if it is the only sensible way to do good.”84 
Similarly, Robert Goodin argues that one might be 
compelled to privilege one’s fellow countrymen in 
order to fulfill one’s general duties.85 In our view, 
however, these positions do nothing to alleviate 
the concern that distributions from the top 0.1 
percent to the top 1 percent do not meaningfully 
fulfill any moral duties to the other 99 percent.
What might justify the obvious abandonment 
of those suffering in the global 99 percent? The 
theory of nationalism, which sets forth several 
duties that apply to individuals within a smaller 
collective, offers one possible response. David 
Miller identifies five aspects to a nationalist 
obligation: (i) a common identity (ii) that is 
marked off by a distinctive public culture, (iii) in 
which members recognize special obligations to 
one another, (iv) regard the nation as a valuable 
good, and (v) aspire to be politically self-
determining.86 Yael Tamir suggests that liberal 
nationalism is not grounded in consent or 
reciprocity; instead, it is based on shared feelings 
of belonging or connectedness.87
Small collective units of humans engender a 
closeness and, inevitably, a feeling of mutual 
obligation. The family unit is the most obvious 
example. However, when the ties that bind 
individuals are stretched too far and the elements 
of common identity or public culture are so 
strained that they render their application 
meaningless, they may no longer warrant mutual 
obligation.
Consider three towns: Utqiagvik (formerly 
known as Barrow), Alaska; El Paso, Texas; and 
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Utqiagvik is the 
northernmost city in the United States. It falls 
inside the Arctic Circle on Alaska’s northern coast. 
The city has been a home to an indigenous Inuit 
group for more than 1,000 years. The lifestyle, 
jobs, and economy revolve around the activities 
one might expect given its location. It is difficult to 
imagine two places with greater contrasts in terms 
of size, weather, lifestyle, jobs, and economy than 
Utqiagvik and El Paso, a west Texas city that lies 
adjacent to Ciudad Juarez. In 2019 Ronald Rael 
and Virginia San Fratello designed an art 
installation: a set of pink seesaws bridging the 
border between the United States and Mexico, 
with a beam in the border wall itself acting as the 
fulcrum.88 According to Rael, it is an effort to bring 
“jobs, excitement and togetherness [to] the border 
wall.”
Despite being in different countries, images of 
children on either side of the wall playing 
together illustrate a connection similar to that one 
might expect from the conditions like those 
described by Miller — a connection that could 
never be achieved between El Paso and Utqiagvik. 
Even the languages spoken in El Paso and Ciudad 
Juarez (English and Spanish) bear a closer link 
than the languages in El Paso and Utqiagvik, 
where the locals speak Inupiaq and have long 
81
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rejected outside (read: U.S.) cultural influences, 
even changing the city’s name from Barrow to 
Utqiagvik in 2016.89
Is instinctive human closeness — such as the 
connections established on the seesaws of El Paso 
and Ciudad Juarez — less relevant than the 
obligations that connect El Paso and Utqiagvik 
merely because of the shape of U.S. borders? 
Which pair of cities really shares a connection, a 
culture, and mutual obligations? Do El Paso and 
Utqiagvik have a way of sharing aspirations, 
including the mutual desire to be politically self-
determining, or regard the nation as a valuable 
good because they share a common culture? It 
seems difficult to base obligations on arbitrarily 
drawn borders.
John Rawls suggests that richer nations 
should provide aid to poorer societies to help 
them develop better political systems based on 
justice. In Law of Peoples,90 he argues a weaker 
version of his original position on global justice, a 
concept expressed in his A Theory of Justice.91 But 
he remains indifferent to the inequalities that 
might arise once this goal has been achieved, 
which is why his global theory is said to focus on 
the equality of peoples as opposed to persons.
Rawls has been widely criticized for the 
narrow scope of his work. For example, Derek 
Parfit believes that Rawls should better account 
for global inequality.92 Parfit suggests that the 
difference principle — which gives absolute 
priority to ensuring a benefit to those who are 
worse off — cannot credibly be limited to borders 
of a nation state. Instead, he says there is no 
reason not to extend the principle globally. 
Separately, Pogge and Charles Beitz argue that the 
things that bind nations together, including 
complex economic and social interdependence, 
have grown increasingly complex such that the 
interconnectedness could justify the type of 
cooperation on a global level that Rawls argued 
for within the state.93
This position is important in the context of 
discussions about how to tax MNEs fairly and 
distribute the income derived from that tax 
revenue. The Rawlsian analysis, which recognizes 
obligations that arise in complex systems of social 
cooperation, cannot ignore the fact that MNEs 
span the globe. By their very nature, they cross 
national boundaries; therefore, when considering 
how justice applies to MNEs and the tax revenues 
that arise from their operations, a global solution 
is inviting. Pillar 1 of BEPS 2.0 doesn’t couch the 
idea that taxing rights should focus on consumers 
or users in the language of justice or fairness. 
Rather, it is the language that one might expect to 
be used in the boardrooms of MNEs or the 
government offices of countries seeking to further 
their own individual interests without regard to 
what Rawlsian justice, global prioritarianism, or 
egalitarianism might require.
In the 21st century, the complex interplay 
between economic entities renders the concept of 
the nation-state far more amorphous than it was 
before. Cities like London, Tokyo, and New York 
have far more in common with each other than 
they do with Scunthorpe, Niseko, and Utqiagvik, 
despite each of those towns sharing a country 
with each of those cities. Similarly, international 
treaties confirming economic, defense, and 
political arrangements — including the complex 
relationships represented by the EU, Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, and NATO — make it 
difficult to isolate the interests of one country as a 
wholly separate unit. Written in 1624, the oft-
quoted line from John Donne’s Devotions Upon 
Emergent Occasions has never been more apt: “No 
man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a 
piece of the continent, a part of the main.”
The political and economic obligations that 
arise as in this connected world must, at some 
stage, invite political philosophers to reconsider 
the parochial nature of their work — especially 
those who take the Rawlsian position on 
nationally confined redistribution. From an 
egalitarian perspective, the moral imperative 
demands one take account of global inequalities. 
One who argues for a position that ignores global 
inequalities is simply advocating for the interests 
of the top 1 percent and is acting as a political 
lobbyist, not a moral beacon.
89
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VI. Conclusion
The Village of Billionaires parable debunks 
the “fairness” and “fair share” concepts favoring 
redistribution of wealth and resources when the 
redistribution is limited to the borders of 
developed nations. Instead, the presence of 
absolute poverty globally renders the relative 
poverty within developed economies trivial and 
not fit for fairness or fair share redistribution 
demands. Resource allocation locally — whether 
that means within a family unit, a region within a 
state, a single state, or even within all OECD 
member states — simply demonstrates the use of 
political power in advancing self-interest. Sadly, 
much like a single meal supplied to an 
impoverished individual, the parable of the 
Village of Billionaires leaves one feeling 
emptiness and despair — a truth with which 
international relief agencies are all too familiar. 
Durable solutions to international wealth 
disparity are elusive. Citing a deeper 
understanding of fairness and the meaning of a 
true fair share, charities, engaged scholars and 
political actors may continue to press for change, 
taking small steps to encourage the global 1 
percent — and the governments of the countries 
in which they live — to contribute more revenue 
to international development regardless of 
whether that revenue is attributable to successful 
BEPS adjustments. In so doing, the elite need not 
cede taxing power to undeveloped and 
developing economies that may not deploy their 
taxing power efficiently. Instead, the OECD and 
other international agencies dedicated to 
developing and improving tax structures could 
emphasize allocating a larger share of the 
worldwide tax base to regions where wages and 
resources are low, which invites international 
exploitation by MNEs, by defining the tax base 
and its allocation in terms of value created by 
labor and resources rather than consumer 
markets.94
Or one might seek to level worldwide 
resources under a utopian (or dystopian) system 
of redistribution based on a worldwide Marxian 
model, a theory that has already proven 
unworkable even on a small, national scale.95
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